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Visible under the Veil: 







This paper seeks to characterize new meanings attached to women’s veiling in an 
Islamic public space, drawing from observations, interviews and field notes collected 
among various women’s groups in Afghanistan. It is argued that while the chadari - or 
burqa, as the Western press miscalled it, using the Urdu denomination- has become the 
ultimate symbol of women’s oppression for Western audiences, it is necessary to take a 
closer look at its multiple and often contradictory uses and to contextualise the reasons 
for its maintenance, despite the downfall of the Taliban regime. Ethnographic research 
demonstrates that women who are attempting to access public spaces have developed 
creative strategies of dissimulation to get public recognition. They have become visible 
under the veil and have sometimes been able to challenge gender hierarchies behind the 
appearance of compliance and conformity. These findings challenge liberal ideas 
according to which women’s visibility in public spaces is a necessary guarantee for their 
emancipation and their agency. In the context of foreign military occupation and 
increased insecurity, control by the state of women’s appearance in public settings is to 
be understood as a means to assert sovereignty and to preserve a sense of national 
autonomy. As in earlier colonial encounters, an area of cultural resistance has developed 
around women’s bodies that constrain the modalities of women’s re-entry in the public 
sphere. As a result, women have been left with no other choice but to adapt and find 
alternative ways to make their voice heard. This means, in practice, that veiling and 
bodywork in general are to be read as feminine performances destined to manage others’ 
impressions and not as mere acts of obedience to religious prescriptions.  
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Khâ I na-shawi raswâ amrang-ejamâ’at bâsh 
Not to be considered strange, conform to the crowd 
- Persian proverb 
 
I came for the second time to Afghanistan in 2007, four years after my first 
journey in 2003-2004, in order to study the modalities and conditions of women’s re-
entry in the public domain. Since my first journey, the political situation had dramatically 
worsened with the insurgency gaining in strength all over the country. As a result, I was 
not surprised to discover that not only the chadari
2
 had not disappeared from the streets 
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of Kabul, but also that women, in certain districts of the city, tended to veil more. This 
trend was perceived as problematic and worrying for Western constituencies, since it 
challenged the scenario that had been designed prior to the military intervention. In this 
scenario, women, once liberated, would naturally throw away their ‘mobile prisons’ and 
enjoy their newly acquired freedom by venturing burqa-free outside of their homes.  
Indeed, after 9/11, the West has been bombarded with images of Afghan women 
covered from head to toe under their blue chadari. The chadari suddenly became the 
symbol of women’s oppression, making Afghan women’s bodies markers of their 
absolute ‘otherness’. As a result of these discourses, the necessity to ‘lift the veil’
3
 was an 
argument used to gather public support for the military intervention. Seven years after the 
intervention of the coalition forces, as security continues to worsen and the Karzai 
government is attempting to bring the insurgents/Taliban to the negotiations table, 
women have tended to re-veil and use dissimulation instead of exposure as a safer 
strategy to reach the public.  
In the West, visibility and power have been defined as synonymous terms rather 
than as historically related positions. This is because, as Silverstein (2008, 119) puts it, 
“the institutionalization of a distinction between the public and the private is considered 
central to the functioning of liberal political culture, as is the situating of religion in the 
private.” Social scientists (Rosaldo and Lamphere1974; Ortner 1996) have tended to analyse 
gender relations in other societies through the prism of the public/domestic divide and to 
explain the ‘universal subordination of women’ through women’s relegation to the 
domestic domain and their ‘invisibility’ in the public realm. However, as much as these 
categories might be useful to describe women’s situation in Western societies, they 
largely misrepresent and ignore the position of women living in Muslim societies. In 
Afghanistan, masculine and feminine spheres of influence are segregated and oftentimes, 
complementary
4
 and religion is not alienated from other spheres of life. Of course, the 
state-imposed compulsory veiling of women, under the mujjahedin regime and later on, 
the Taliban, has made of the chadari an instrument for controlling women’s presence in 
the public domain together with a symbol of masculine domination. But normatively, 
women’s veiling is a religious sign of modesty, the marker of gender segregation and it 
should not be systematically read as a sign of women’s oppression.  
In this paper, I discuss the different and contradictory meanings attached to 
women’s veiling practices and dissimulation strategies: Where and when are women 
using chadari and for what purposes? Who are the women who are not wearing it? How 
are these signs read and interpreted in public spaces? Through an analysis of women’s 
self-presentation, I underline the complex ways in which women are attempting to 
become legitimate actors in the public sphere.  
Scholars working on gender in Islam have often interpreted the various styles of 
veiling available in Muslim societies as embodied markers of particular ways of 
practicing piety or producing pious selves through body discipline (Mahmood 2005) or as 
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an expression of opposition to Western definitions of modernity (Mernissi 1992; Göle 
1996). If all these explanations are contextually valid, my research among women MPs in 
Afghanistan suggests that the performative and strategic dimensions of veiling are the 
dominant motives that guide women’s gestures. The women I interviewed and observed 
during my fieldwork were more invested in expressing pious identities via clothing than 
in cultivating virtuous selves. Veiling and clothing were part of intricate strategies aiming 
at managing others’ impressions in the context of public interactions where the presence 
of women was broadly considered as ‘abnormal’. Issues of religion and faith were not the 
main centres of their attention, even though all of these women were undeniably strong 
believers.  
In the first section of this paper, I place the veil in its cultural and social context, 
in an attempt to shed light on the variety of interpretations of male-female relations 
existing among the different ethnic and social groups populating the area.  I also 
demonstrate that the use of the veil is context-specific, related to notions of private/public 
spaces and therefore entangled in broader communicative patterns that impose restraints 
on both men and women who are unrelated to each other. In the second section, I locate 
the debates around the ‘veiling/revealing’ of women’s bodies that have emerged 
following the fall of the Taliban in the specific context of the military occupation. I 
compare the current situation with earlier colonial encounters during which women’s 
bodies became part of political struggles over national identity and sovereignty. I then 
move on to analyse the public performances and personal experiences of women MPs 
(Members of Parliament) who have entered the National Assembly in 2005. I distinguish 
between ‘nationalist/jihadis’ women whose strict veiling is a sign of opposition to 
western influence in internal affairs and ‘liberal’ women whose veiling practices are less 
consistent and more context-specific. By looking at these public gestures, I aim to 
illustrate the ordinary ways in which women struggle daily with cultural ideas about the 
female body and highlight the political and performative dimension of women’s clothing.  
 
Honour, Veiling and Etiquette. 
It is difficult to generalize about the meaning of the veil in Afghanistan, since 
veiling practices widely vary from one region, ethnic or social group to another. I do not 
intend here to give an exhaustive overview of the ‘language of the veil’ since it would 
necessitate a detailed cross-geographic examination that a single article cannot achieve. I 
however wish to underline how veiling is central to the Afghan etiquette and how its use 
is entangled in broader social relations defined by gendered rules of politeness.  
The veil is tightly connected to notions of honour (izzat). A woman shows her 
adherence to the honour system by doing pardah
5
, i.e covering her head and avoiding 
contacts with unrelated men. By doing so, she ensures that the honour of her male 
relatives (namus) is preserved. The veil therefore operates as a mediator of male-female 
relations in a society that puts high value on a social order maintained through human 
efforts at disciplining ‘natural inclinations’ (nafs). However, the gamut of interpretations 
remains quite broad, as the variety of veils worn by women ranges from chadari of 
various colours, to long black hijab in the Western provinces running alongside Iran, to 
long colourful veils resting on the top of the head in the central highlands of Hazarajat.  
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Despite these variations, it can be said that the veil is an instrument aiming to 
accommodate the segregation of unrelated men and women, i.e individuals not belonging 
to the same korwal or ‘inhabitants sharing a household’ (Anderson 1982). The Afghan 
society, like many other honour-based societies, distinguishes between dakhili (the 
private sphere, the household, what should remain hidden) and biruni (the street, literally, 
the ‘outside’). Men’s honour (namus) is maintained through their capacity to control 
women and restrict their movements outside of the household. I often heard men saying: 
‘Zan namus e ma’s’ (‘The woman is our honour’). Soldiers will also say: ‘Watan namus e 
ma’s’ (‘The nation is our honour’). Women stepping outside of their houses are 
traditionally veiled and accompanied by a mahram, that is a male relative with whom 
sexual intercourse is virtually impossible because it would be considered incestuous. The 
role of the mahram is to protect women’s honour.  
Namus can be defined as that which is defended by men for honour to be upheld, 
instead of acted upon to achieve honour (such as hospitality). If someone offends the 
rules of the gendered order, then there is reason to act in defence of one’s namus. Namus 
is thus an important institution for maintaining the gender segregated order of the society. 
For instance, women will ‘do pardah’ to maintain the reputation of their family: their veil 
is a sign of their modesty and more generally, of their adherence to the honour system.  
These rules defined in the Pashtunawali (‘the way of the Pashtuns’, the tribal code 
of honour, a conceptual body of rules passed on by oral tradition) are what make up most 
of the Afghan etiquette. Even though Pashtuns represent the largest ethnic group in the 
country (40% of the total population), other ethnic groups such as Uzbek, Tajik, Hazara, 
etc. do abide by a code of honour that presents many similarities with the Pashtun one. It 
can be said that Pashtunwali is applied all over the country, even though with various 
degrees according to the different tribes, religious affiliations and social backgrounds.  
Women’s veiling, in particular under the full covering chadari, is to be 
understood as a means to maintain gender boundaries, a central component of the honour 
code. The chadari is mostly worn by married women living in urban areas. It operates as 
a ‘mobile home’ (Abu-Lughod 2002, 785), as a means to maintain women’s separation 
from unrelated men. In Papanek’s words (1982) the chadari is a form of ‘portable 
seclusion’. ‘Everywhere, such veiling signifies belonging to a particular community and 
participating in a moral way of life in which families are paramount in the organization of 
communities and the home is associated with the sanctity of women’ (Abu-Lughod 2002: 
p785). 
The Pashtunwali is built on various principles, including strict gender boundaries. 
Pashtunwali is integral to Pashtun identity. By adhering to Pashtunwali a Pashtun 
possesses honour (izzat); without honor s/he is no longer considered a Pashtun, and is not 
given the rights, protection, and support of the Pashtun community.  
In Pashtun expressions it is recommended that both men and women conceptually 
apply pardah, and doing so is a sign of dignity for both men and women. According to 
anthropologist Jon Anderson (1982) who observed various situations in which the veil is 
used among Ghilzai Pashtuns, the veil is less a means to separate men and women than, 
on the contrary, a device that brings them together by regulating the terms by which they 
are socially present. It is part of a broader pattern of comportment called ‘haya’ or 
‘extreme politeness’ by which persons who could be legitimately married to each other 
are prevented from direct contact and interaction. Indeed, it can be said that men wear a 
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‘veil’ too since their interactions with other marriageable women are accompanied by a 
constellation of behaviours which are equivalents to veiling. For instance, when a man 
and a woman encounter each other outside the kor (household-inhabitants), restraint 
applies equally to both. The man will divert his gaze or act as if the woman was absent. 
He may additionally cover his face and turn away. He may also cover his mouth and 
avoid eye contact. This myriad of disengaging actions is to be understood as a form of 
respect on a man’s part. “Put another way, the veil is part of a pattern of comportment in 
which both sexes participate with slightly different but overlapping inflections” 
(Anderson 1982, 402). 
A parallel can be drawn between the privacy maintained through the use of 
chadari and the traditional Afghan home, surrounded by its undistinguished compound 
walls, where the secrets of the family are kept. Indeed, indigenous domestic architecture 
is inward-looking and exteriors present anonymous surfaces to outsiders. Dislike of 
ostentation, another prominent characteristic, is evident in architectural patterns (Dupree-
Hatch 2002). The traditional architectural ideals promote the hidden nature of the 
intimate to the outside world. Within compound walls, the protection against outsiders is 
complete. Unrelated men are never brought inside without a warning call. “A male visitor 
will never enter a room without knocking or coughing to announce his presence” 
(Dupree-Hatch 1998, 52).  
Women, as central pillars of the family, are closely associated with this intimate 
and secret world. By wearing chadari, women symbolically carry the walls of their 
compound with them (Papanek 1973, 35). The sexual excitation, which is believed to 
exist when a man and a woman unknown to each other meet face to face, is prevented 
within the compound. Metonymically, the veil or chadari operates as a form of  
“symbolic shelter” (Papanek 1973) and announces that a woman is behaving in a proper 
manner and has dismissed the possibility of sexual desire and interaction. However, 
veiling can have other meanings and women are particularly creative in clouding their 
public performances. Indeed, the typical symbolic associations of the veil are sometimes 
manipulated and reversed by individual women. 
 Stories of illicit sexual adventures, for instance, had mythic qualities in Kabul and 
women themselves criticized other women for using the chadari to conduct illicit sexual 
adventures or escape from the control of their relatives. One story was told of women 
walking Chicken and Flower streets in Kabul city centre, fully covered under their 
chadari, and stopping men in an attempt to sell sexual services. I never witnessed such 
activities myself, but I always wondered about the logistics of sex work in Afghanistan 
when hearing about the issue. Nevertheless, the anonymity provided by the veil means 
that a woman’s identity cannot be revealed and the situation can remain secret. Ironically, 
the veil which primary aims is to prevent adultery can be used in adultery’s cause.  
In the same way, many women’s rights activists, while opposing the compulsory 
veiling of women under chadari, used it to enjoy freedom of movement while carrying 
out their work. For them, the chadari was a symbol of women’s oppression but by 
complying to cultural norms, they were able to work within the system to bring about 
change.  The chadari was a guarantee of protection, particularly necessary when 
travelling to remote areas where security was often hectic. The example of the 
Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan provides a good illustration of 
the instrumental nature of the chadari among politically engaged women. Indeed, their 
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documentation of human and women’s rights abuses under the Taliban was entirely 
realized ‘under the chadari’ (Anon. 2007d). During my fieldwork, I met a great number 
of women’s rights activists who continued wearing the chadari, not only for security 
reasons but also to gain people’s respect and trust when working in rural areas, where 
people tended to be suspicious towards anyone coming from the ‘outside’. This was, for 
instance, a strategy adopted by Rahela
6
, a member of the Afghan Women’s Network, 
when she lobbied mullahs on women’s rights in rural areas: 
At first, it was difficult for us, women, to approach mullahs. They were reluctant 
to talk to us. But they gradually got used to us. By wearing chadari, we eventually gained 
their respect. (Anon. 2007e). 
Finally, unlike in Turkey or Egypt where the State has initiated prolonged efforts 
to secularize society, wearing the veil in Afghanistan cannot be read as a way for women 
to assert their faith or their Muslim identity, even though most women would say that it is 
a Muslim woman’s duty to cover. But since the majority of Afghans are religious and 
religion is deeply ingrained in the everyday, veiling has become for most women part of 
the ‘habitus’, something women just do when they leave their house or when they are in 
the presence of strangers. More subtle uses of the veil, such as decisions to cover one’s 
face to demonstrate respect for an older man or on the contrary, refusals to do so, are 
practices that reveal the potential power of women in challenging the gendered order 
(Abu-Lughod 1986). In the same way, the multiplicity of veils available especially in 
urban areas where some level of diversity is authorized, provide women with a relatively 
wide range of options that involve both judgements of taste and religious thinking. As a 
communicative device that conveys meanings, the veil is one among the many other tools 
women use to convey messages to their audience in public settings.  
 
The legacy of fear and the occupation 
The short period of relative liberalism that marked the three or four years after the 
eviction of the Taliban gave opportunities for individuals to experiment with the way 
they appeared in public. During my first journey in 2003-2004, one could see in the 
streets of Kabul, especially in the city centre where stores selling bright coloured clothes 
imported from neighbouring countries had re-opened, young men with blue jeans and 
long hair or girls wearing colourful veils over semi-long blouses. These street scenes had 
become more rare in 2007. An increased level of insecurity, with regular suicide attacks, 
robberies and kidnappings, had initiated a reversed return to physical conformity in 
public spaces.     
 The necessity to remain anonymous in public is closely related to the increasing 
level of public violence that women have experienced over the past decades. However, 
despite the West’s promises to ‘liberate Afghan women’, and in spite of the presence of 
International troops on its soil, the State has been unable to protect women in their 
transition from the private to the public sphere. In conflict-affected areas, women 
continue to face sexual violence, abduction, or forced or underage marriage (Azerbaijani-
Moghaddam 2009, 67). However, the perpetrators remain immune from prosecution 
since sexual violence is a taboo and the justice system is weak and corrupt.
7
 The 
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7
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often been reluctant to report it to the authorities. However, in recent years, some reports have underlined a 
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explanations I often heard from women wearing chadari was that it allowed some 
privacy and created a sense of security, when the outside world, beyond the compounds’ 
walls of the house was seen as threatening, chaotic and oppressive. For many women, the 
chadari increased their mobility while guaranteeing their anonymity, a precious asset in a 
volatile security environment. 
In the meantime, the foreign occupation
8
of the country and the International 
Community’s insistence on the necessity to carry out important and rapid social reforms 
has created tensions at different levels of the Afghan society. The current preoccupation 
of the Afghan government with controlling women’s appearance in public is to be 
understood in the light of this external pressure. With the return of conservative elements 
within the political arena, an area of cultural resistance has emerged around women and 
the family.  
Similar developments have been observed at other moments of the Afghan history 
when foreign powers have attempted to impose their domination over the country. During 
the USSR-sponsored Communist regime, for instance, Kabul began to be perceived as the 
capital of sin and corruption with women’s new visibility considered as a sign of cultural 
pollution (Dupree-Hatch 2001, 150; Ahmed-Ghosh 2003, 7). The national project, which 
materialized after the withdrawal of the Red Army, during the civil war and reached its 
extreme with the emergence of the Taliban, was predicated on a rejection of modernity, a 
return to an essentialized rural and mythical tradition (Olesen 1996, 279). The 
consequences were enormous for women who were erased from the professional and 
intellectual life of the country.  
In her book Women and Gender in Islam (1992), social historian Leila Ahmed has 
underlined the relation between colonial encounters and the emergence of specific 
discourses on the veil in the Muslim world. In Egypt under British rule or in Algeria 
under French domination, foreign political elites used the veil as a symbol of Muslim 
women’s oppression to justify the colonial enterprise.  Veiling, under such circumstances, 
turned into an act of resistance against the modernizing elite co-opted by the colonial 
establishment (Ahmed 1992, 152).  
It is certainly possible to draw a parallel between the current situation in 
Afghanistan and earlier colonial periods during which discourses on women and the veil 
first emerged. After years of total disregard for Afghan people, the sudden interest of the 
West in the plight of Afghan women and the focus on the burqa confirms that old 
colonial narratives on the veil have been reactivated in order to gather public support for 
the military intervention. At once urged to take back their ‘freedom’ and unveil by the 
West and pressured to remain faithful to Afghan ‘culture’ by the new regime, women in 
occupied Afghanistan have become a ‘figment in someone’s else dream’, as Azar Nafisi 
(2003) puts it in her memoir Reading Lolita in Teheran. This renewed public attention to 
women’s bodies and the use of ‘colonial feminism’ (Ahmed 1992) as an imperialist tool 
                                                                                                                                                 
behavioural shift, with families (probably encouraged by the media and human rights organizations) 
beginning to go public and threatening to commit mass suicide if the perpetrators were not brought to 
justice (IRIN-News 2008; Nagpal 2009; Muahid 2008). 
8
 It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the nature of the neo-colonial state. Other authors, however, 
have used the ‘post-colonial’ framework to explain the nature of the power dynamics at stake in 
contemporary Afghanistan. See (Rostami-Povey 2007; Lindisfarne 2008; Suhrke 2007a; 2007b). 
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to assert domination, has trapped the struggle for women’s rights in struggles over culture. 
Various political developments that have taken place in recent years confirm this vision. 
In order to preserve an illusion of political autonomy and resist Western influence, 
for instance, conservative MPs have submitted various draft laws aiming at preserving 
patriarchal authority. These draft laws proposed the reinstallation of the religious police, 
the reopening of the Ministry for the Elimination of Vice and the Promotion of Virtue, 
and a ban on Western clothes such as jeans, long hair for men, cosmetics and makeup for 
women (Heikkila 2008). More recently in April 2009, Karzai signed a personal status law 
for Shias legalizing the rape of a wife by her husband and forbidding Shia women to 
leave their house without their husbands’ permission
9
. These legal proposals, even 
though not yet approved, are already announcing a return to an orthodox interpretation of 
shariah after a brief period of legal diversity, associated with anarchy and loose morals.  
Afghan women are immensely aware of the conditions in which they have to 
negotiate their entry in the public domain. This knowledge is an embodied knowledge. It 
is the product of long years of war during which women have suffered from officially 
sanctioned discrimination. Visibility, over these past three decades, has found new 
meanings. In Western societies, the visibility of people brings about public security in 
urban spaces. Public figures are expected to reveal their private life and expose it to 
public scrutiny. For Afghan women, public visibility has become equal to insecurity and 
to being subjected to constant control by others (the police, religious leaders, community 
and neighbours). Even though the moral police have disappeared in most cities, the new 
Islamic Republic still expects people to conform to Islamic prescriptions.  
This controlling gaze is the same apparatus that Foucault (1977) referred to in 
Discipline and Punish in his description of the architecture of Bentham’s Panopticon, the 
huge prison with only a single jailor. As described by Foucault, the concept of the design 
is to allow an observer to observe all prisoners without the prisoners being able to tell 
whether they are being watched, thereby conveying the sentiment of an invisible 
omniscience. Thus the visibility of an individual and his awareness of the existence of 
authority and the possible presence of a surveyor result in his/her constant obligation to 
observe discipline. The efficiency of the system lies in the fact that the individual 
“assumes responsibility for the constraints of power,” making himself “the principle of 
his own subjection” (Foucault 1977, 202-203). A feeling of insecurity results from the 
prisoner’s constant visibility. This fear constitutes the central motor of self-discipline. In 
the case of Afghanistan, the fear of punishments has resulted in the production of ‘docile 
bodies’ that have internalized power hierarchies to the extent that they have become 
almost natural. The reluctance of women to remove their chadari is a good illustration of 
the long lasting psychological effects of the Mujahideen’s and Taliban’s “technologies of 
power”.  
As Afghan sociologist Nasrine Gross (Gross 2007) argues, the Taliban rule has 
been particularly traumatic for Afghans because for the first time, their faith, a 
fundamental component of their identity, has been radically questioned. If before the 
Taliban, rarely did people interrogate the depth of their own “Muslimhood,” the harsh 
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 The new and redrafted law was signed in mid July 2009. The new version omits original provisions that 
allowed men to demand sex from their wives and that required women to ask their husbands’ permission to 
leave their home. However, the law still includes a provision that states a man does not have to provide 
financial support for his wife unless he has ‘access to her.’ 
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rules and punishments imposed by the religious students contributed to spread a general 
feeling of guilt regarding religion. Indeed, under the constant control of the religious 
police, men and women, especially in the cities, were persistently reminded of their 
inherent “sinning” nature. According to my observations, the long-term effect of such a 
trauma is noticeable in people’s obsessive urge to justify the way they physically present 
themselves or to make comments on the ways other people look. Of course, in any 
society, people are always expressing something with clothing, sending out intentional or 
unintentional signals about themselves. Clothing is an important visual aspect of 
performance, part of the expressive equipment identified with the performer. In the case 
of Afghanistan, as clothing has become the centre of political attention, physical displays 
that do not strictly conform with the norm are perceived as potentially threatening to the 
social order.  
During the civil war (Mujahideen era, 1992-1996) and until the Taliban era (1996-
2001), Afghan women have lived with the same feeling of continual but secret and 
unverifiable control. Thus, the experience of wearing chadari has become in fact the 
paradoxical experience of some kind of freedom along with an acceptance of enclosure 
and discipline. To be disciplined and similar to others allowed women to be less 
subjected to others’ sight and consequently be freer in their movements. This 
dissimulation and social invisibility in terms of appearances and behaviours is constantly 
shifting, according to the status, gender and age of individual actors. To maintain their 
security and right of presence in social spaces, individuals must obey assorted codes that 
are particular to each space or vis-à-vis the others. While such codes existed in 
Afghanistan well before the Taliban, the Taliban regime has refashioned them, forcing 
individuals to play roles and to adopt new appearances according to their moral system. 
In the new Islamic Republic, even though such rules are no longer officially sanctioned, 
they remain an unwritten law. As a result, dissimulation through conformism constitutes 
the dominant strategy to access public spaces.  
Women have adopted strategies of dissimulation and invisibility that have become 
part of a process of social inclusion and negotiation. For instance, women continue to 
wear the full covering chadari in order to go to work, attend public meetings and 
demonstrations. In June 2007, for example, hundreds of women organized a collective 
peace prayer at the sacred Shrine of the Prophet (Kherqa Sharif) in Kandahar, a mosque 
that is normally barred to women. The mullah even allowed the women to broadcast their 
prayers from the shrine loudspeaker (AdvocacyNet 2007). A few months later, in January 
2008, 600 women rallied in Kandahar in order to protest against the kidnapping of an 
American female aid worker (BBC 2008). This public event was even more surprising in 
that it took place in one of the most conservative areas of the Pashtun South where 
women are rarely seen in public spaces. Women’s demonstrations of this type were not 
isolated occurrences. In May 2005, hundreds of widows marched in Kabul in protest 
against the kidnapping of Clementina Cantoni, an Italian aid worker from CARE 
International. A river of blue chadari suddenly flooded Kabul city’s centre, displaying 
photographs of Clementina and carrying banners requesting her immediate release. Under 
the Taliban regime, women protested on several occasions, for instance, against an edict 
that closed public baths and against the rise of the price of bread. Protected from external 
gazes, able to see without being seen, women could feel safe to occupy the public arena 
and make their voices heard. Their ‘absent presence’, to use Amir-Ebrahimi’s words 
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(2006), under the disciplinary monotony of the chadari, enabled women to step in spaces 
reserved to men. 
Women who have broken into the political apparatus share this common-sense 
understanding of the possible physical and social dangers associated with visibility. In the 
section that follows, I look more precisely at political women’s public performances in a 
space where their presence remains highly contested: the Afghan National Assembly. 
Indeed, the new Constitution ratified in 2004 foresaw a 25 percent quota for women in 
the Parliament, a political move initiated with the view of repairing past injustices. This 
legislation was passed thanks to the pressure of women’s groups and the international 
community, but jihadi leaders who occupied the majority at the seats in the Assembly 
broadly perceived women’s presence on their side as ‘abnormal’ and as a result of 
exogenous forces, with little or no endogenous legitimacy at all.  
Even though adding women in politics can never be a guarantee for gender 
equality in the broader society, the presence of women in the parliament has undeniably 
been a positive step. It remains that the women who have joined the legislative apparatus 
are not only divided along political, class and ethnic lines, but their room of manoeuvre 
within such a conservative environment is extremely low. As a result, many female MPs 
have had to develop subtle strategies in order to gain political recognition and validation 
from their male counterparts. This included, among other techniques of body-discipline, a 
constant attention to the way they looked and veiled in public. 
 
Veiled Politics 
An observation of clothing and veiling practices among women involved in 
politics in Afghanistan reveals the central and contested place of Islam as a political 
category in the new Islamic Republic. It also sheds light on the values women should 
comply with in order to reach out to the public. In this respect, the comparison between 
parliamentary women and female university student is very telling. Female university 
students with whom I spent time at the beginning of my fieldwork struggled to veil as 
little as possible in order to display a modern yet Muslim persona.  In contrast, women 
MPs had to some extent to renounce to women’s issues and veil more strictly if they 
wanted to gain entry into mainstream politics. Different social positions involved 
contrasting uses of the body.  
In general, women sitting in the parliament could be divided into two categories
10
: 
Conservative/nationalist women who defended a formalist approach to Koran and liberal 
women who supported an interpretive approach. While the majority of them belonged to 
the first group and had been co-opted by various mujjahedin factions, women from both 
tendencies agreed that Islam provided them with a means of being involved in the public 
sphere. However, their fashion statements mirrored their political inclinations and to 
some extent, their different understanding of Islam and the place of women in society. 
Generally, political women’s veiling practices was informed by the geographic 
location of their respective constituencies. Women MPs originating from rural areas felt 
more compelled to veil in a more conservative manner than their female colleagues who 
came from urban areas. 
                                                 
10
 The Wolesi Jirga is mainly composed of Pashtuns (118 seats), Tajiks/Aimaqs (53 seats), Hazaras/Shias 
(41 seats) and Uzbeks (20 seats). For further details on the ethnic and political composition of the 
parliament, see (Wilder 2005) 
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For Shukria Barakzai (MP for Kabul province), it does not matter if she wears 
small veils because people who vote for her are educated…they come from the city. For 
me it is different. My people did not go to school. My people are illiterate and 
conservative. So I have to pay attention to the veils I wear, an MP from Takhar. 
explained to me (Anon. 2007b). 
Women who were affiliated with jihadi groups tended to dress more traditionally 
than women who belonged to more liberal groups. Their veils were longer and less 
colourful (black, white or light beige) and their interpretation of women’s rights was 
based on a belief in the inherently different nature of men and women. Many of them 
wore chadari or long veils when returning to their province of origin but abandoned it as 
soon as they returned to Kabul. Their public performances conveyed monolithic 
nationalist meanings about the primary role of women as mothers and family carers.  
For female MPs who affiliated themselves with more liberal groups, choices of 
veils’ colours and length were a matter of perpetual arrangements and meticulously 
weighted decisions. Veils and clothes changed according to the audience they faced and 
the context in which they navigated. Their decision to wear chadari when travelling to 
the provinces was mostly influenced by the security situation or the individual dressing 
practices of their female colleagues. Their performances were more contradictory and 
less consistent than conservative women and involved constant negotiations and 
calculations. ‘If I don’t wear chadari when I go back to Takhar and my colleague Bilqhis 
(another female MP from Takhar province) does, then she appears as the modest one and 
I appear as the amoral one’ (Anon. 2007b), an MP from Takhar province noted to 
underline the necessity to embody strict Muslim norms in order to reach out to more 
‘traditional’ or rural audiences. 
For both ‘nationalist’ and ‘liberal’ women, clothing was linked to different 
conceptions of the place of Islam in politics. For nationalist women, wearing long veils 
and occasionally chadari was partly a means to conform to proper religious and cultural 
practices. But most importantly, it was about honouring the work achieved by the 
mujjahedin during the jihad and opposing the hegemonic influence of the West in 
internal affairs. On February, 23
rd
 2007, in a public gathering organized by jihadi leaders 
in Kabul National Stadium, Shakila Hachemi, MP of Logar province, took the 
microphone and harangued the crowd, denouncing the blasphemy committed by her 
fellow MP Malalai Joya who had accused some mujjahedin sitting in the Parliament of 
being war criminals (Islah-e Milli 2007). The rally had been organized in order to gain 
public support for a legal proposal preventing the state from independently prosecuting 
people for war crimes committed during conflicts in recent decades
11
.  
That Hachemi was given the opportunity to talk in a conservative assembly of 
prominent political leaders, not particularly renowned for their progressive approach to 
women’s issues, was in itself very telling. It showed that far from being united, women 
from different political and ethnic backgrounds, tended to engage in identity politics and 
put forward the specific political agenda of their own ethnic or religious groups, while 
dismissing or ignoring the ones of their gender. Vice President, Mohammad Karim 
Khalili, Lower House Speaker, Mohammad Younus Qanooni, former Jihadi Leaders, 
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 The lower house of parliament, the Wolesi Jirga, approved the bill after President Hamid Karzai revised 
an initial bill that had been approved by both chambers of parliament that gave amnesty to all Afghans 
involved in war crimes during the last three decades of fighting. 
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commanders and a number of MPs took part in the gathering. Surrounded by heavily 
armed men, raising an accusative finger to the sky, her speech suddenly reached a climax: 
‘Death to Malalai Joya! Death to Human Rights!’ (Anon. 2007a) she screamed while 
receiving an overwhelming round of applause.  
The association of Joya with Human Rights and therefore, with the West, was 
typical of conservative/nationalist discourses. Indeed, Joya was regularly accused by her 
detractors of being sponsored by Western leftist groups and as a result, of being an infidel, 
a Communist and therefore, disrespectful of national values. During her campaign in 
Farah for the legislative elections, Joya’s enemies circulated pamphlets on which she 
appeared bareheaded. The pamphlets called her a ‘prostitute’ sold to the West and 
attacked her for her lack of modesty: ‘If Joya removes her veil now, soon she will remove 
her pants too’, commented one of these pamphlets (Mulvad 2007). Joya’s fearless 
interventions in parliamentary sessions unfailingly provoked sexual insults, physical 
attacks and death threats. A secularist at heart, Joya regularly appeared unveiled on 
foreign TV stations and newspapers, western journalists being particularly fond of her 
outspoken and charismatic character. The outburst of resentment against the values she 
defended (women’s rights, human rights and secularism), ironically forced her to 
constantly wear chadari while travelling in the country. 
In such a conservative atmosphere, women MPs with a liberal agenda for women 
had as a primary goal to keep the support of their own constituencies while lobbying 
potentially supportive men within the parliament. If some of them admitted supporting 
Joya behind closed doors, they paid attention not to be associated too closely with her
12
. 
The way they looked in public was a fundamental issue of attention, many of them 
preferring not to talk to the media at all or appearing on TV in order to have free hands 
for back stage negotiations. In the same way, many ‘liberal’ female candidates to the 
legislative elections conducted their campaign under the chadari and gradually removed 
it once elected.  
Younger female MPs who had lived abroad during the war were less eager to 
compromise and less reluctant to openly support Joya. This was for instance the case of a 
27-years-old female representative of Kabul province, Maryam Sohrat
13
, who had 
returned from her exile in Iran especially to run for the elections. At first glance, the 
poster she had printed for her campaign resembled an ad for a Bollywood blockbuster. It 
showed her smiling face, her hair covered under a bright canary yellow veil over a 
background of a similar color, an image that wanted to transmit hope and change to 
Afghanistan’s youth.  But the image gave rise to severe critics from conservative clerics 
and political leaders. “Her posters are driving our youth towards sin,” thundered the Dari 
language Cheragh newspaper supported by Rabbani, former President of Afghanistan 
and now head of the major opposition party, the United National Front. “It is a political 
weapon against true Islamic voters” (Walsh 2005).  Sitting in UNIFEM resource centre 
for women in Parliament, with her lipstick, fluent English and matching Nike trainers and 
headscarf, Sohrat undeniably brought a touch of glamour to Afghan politics. She recalled:  
                                                 
12
 Some women’s rights activists also disagreed with Joya’s insistence on secularism as a means to enhance 
women’s rights. They perceived her approach as disconnected with the political reality and political 
sensitivities of the country. In their view, gender equality was embedded in Islam. Joya’s desire to 
disconnect politics from religion was, in their opinion, a dangerous path to advance the cause of women. 
13
 For security reasons, her real name has been changed. 
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I got several telephone calls during my campaign. Once, an old man told me: 
‘What is this colour? What is this poster? We are Muslim people! This is an Islamic 
country!”. And I told him: ‘What is wrong with Islam? I have my scarf on and if you are 
talking about the colour, this is my favourite colour, I like it. And if you are talking about 
my smile, it is one of my features. This is not abnormal to smile. I wanted to show what 
the wish of the young generation in Afghanistan is. You know, young people are tired of 
darkness.’ (Anon. 2007c) 
Sohrat’s response to her critics was to a great extent the product of her lack of 
political experience and her second-hand knowledge of the power relations at stake in the 
political apparatus. She envisioned Islam as a religion that promoted gender equality and 
granted many freedoms to women. She was inspired by Islamic feminism and its 
achievements in Iran, Malaysia and elsewhere. Devoutly Muslim, she called herself a 
feminist but avoided using this term in the parliament, for fear of receiving the same 
treatments as Joya and losing her already fragile credibility due to her young age and her 
‘modern’ physical appearance.  
The political characters represented by Malalai Joya and Maryam Sohrat, in spite 
of their differences, present common distinctive features that help us delineate the 
boundaries of women’s political participation and public visibility in contemporary 
Afghanistan. Both MPs are young and educated and both display a physical appearance 
that does not strictly conform to traditional standards of Islamic dressing. In addition, 
both speak fluent English and take their political inspiration from ‘abroad’. Joya looks at 
western secularism while Sohrat draws her political views from models of Islamic 
feminism that have emerged in other Muslim countries. However, neither of them benefit 
from a strong social base of support outside of their limited constituencies: a few 
RAWA
14
/Maoist supporters for Joya and a few University students for Sohrat.  
The reasons behind Joya’s and Sohrat’s political marginality are varied but 
undeniably, the outward looking political postures they embody cannot receive a strong 
echo in the context of the occupation. Of course, neither Joya’s nor Sohrat’s political 
projects aim to target Islam or Afghan culture, but those laws and customs to be found in 
society that express androcentric interests, indifference to women, or misogyny. Such a 
discourse, as seductive as it may be for the urban and educated person’s consciousness, 
has currently no place in the Afghan political landscape.  Without nationalist/Islamic 
veils to ideas of reforms related to women’s issues, the persuasiveness of Joya’s and 
Sohrat’s discourses remains absolutely marginal. 
 
Veiling as performance 
So what do we learn from political women’s public performances? What does 
their veiling and clothing practices teach us about the nature of power relations in 
contemporary Afghanistan? Why are women who have made their ways into the highest 
political circles still reluctant to completely abandon the chadari? What emerges from the 
ethnographic material I have presented above, is that in a context of foreign occupation 
where women’s bodies have become the symbolic markers of the broader social body, 
veiling represents the privileged medium of expression of one’s nationalist endeavours 
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and resistance against external influences. The veil ensures the cohesion of the 
collectivity and provides a sense of national continuity when society is threatened by 
fragmentation through the presence of an external ‘enemy’. By strictly conforming to 
gendered norms, nationalist women strengthen their integration within their own political 
groups. ‘Liberal’ women, i.e women who are more radically inclined to advance 
women’s rights through an interpretive approach of shariah, cannot simply avoid the 
nationalist/Islamic narrative for this would lead, as the case of Joya demonstrates, to their 
total marginalization. The groups to which they belong are too weak already in the 
political landscape and cannot afford a radical rejection of the nationalist narrative. In 
short, in public settings, women from both tendencies have to adjust their performance in 
order to conform with gendered norms of appropriate behaviours in order to maintain 
their public presence.   
In these circumstances, displaying a respectful Muslim persona through proper 
veiling and clothing amounts to affirming one’s patriotic allegiances and a certain form 
of recognition for the historical heritage of the jihad. With a parliament dominated by 
jihadi factions for whom women’s rights are certainly not the priority, women are left 
with little choice but to conform in order to gain men’s recognition. The ‘emotional glue’ 
(Mayer 2000, 3) conveyed by nationalist ideas and symbols, despite their systematic 
reproduction of gender stereotypes, cannot simply be ignored because they also 
participate in the reproduction of a moral code and a collective imaginary. 
Nationalist/conservative women, and to some extent, liberal women too are participating 
in defending the ‘moral code’. Through their dress codes, women compete to embody the 
perfect model of the ‘pure’ and dedicated Muslim mother/sister/sister-in-law/daughter. 
But liberal women’s indirect or direct participation in the reinforcement of this discourse 
allows them to gain credit and support in their own political groups when women’s rights 
issues are put on the negotiation table. 
 I qualify these strategies of ‘performance’ in the sense of Goffman (Goffman 
1956), not because I assume that women’s veiling practices are mere cynical or alienated 
responses to a dominant discourse, but in order to highlight their acknowledgement of 
and participation in a moral system in which their bodies are constant centres of attention. 
Performance designates the use of any of the ways of speaking available to a speaker, in 
their appropriate context. As Goffman puts it, ‘the rules of conduct which bind the actor 
and the recipient together are the bindings of society’ (1956: 25). In Afghanistan, the use 
of the veil is part of a broader set of rules that define proper gender behaviours in public 
settings. These rules apply to both men and women and vary according to variables such 
as age, ethnic affiliations and social status. To some extent, men do wear veils too and 
abide by these rules in their daily interactions with members of the opposite sex. In the 
context of a military occupation, showing respect for these rules, as instrumental as it 
may appear, has become all the more significant that it provides a sense of continuity and 
collective belonging.  
My aim in this paper was not to diminish or question the religious endeavours of 
the women I observed, but rather to underline the possibilities that were enabled through 
the reiteration of these feminine ceremonials. As it would be erroneous to reduce the veil 
to its instrumental functions, it is also inappropriate to see in it a pure religious expression. 
Deference and dissimulation under the veil were indeed political gestures that worked as 
the necessary social make-up for women to break through the ‘public’. A deeper analysis 
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of their motives and actions showed that women were able to strategize and adapt to their 
audience, displaying different layers of their multiple selves, according to the different 
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